Amazon Web Services (AWS)
IAM policies, S3 bucket configurations, EC2 security groups, RDS encryption, CloudTrail coverage, KMS key rotation, Lambda execution roles, and AWS Organizations SCPs reviewed against CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark.
Cloud misconfiguration is the #1 breach vector. IAM policies drift from least-privilege within weeks. Storage buckets default to public access. Roles accumulate over-permissive policies that were added once and never revoked. Encryption gets skipped. Logging has gaps across regions. CipherTrivia systematically audits your AWS, Azure and GCP environments for exactly these structural risks -- benchmarked against CIS and the Well-Architected Framework.
Cloud Config Compliance
Live Scan72% compliant
58% compliant
81% compliant
prod-exports — Public READ
Critical
lambda-exec — Admin policy
High
orders-db — Encryption disabled
High
us-west-2, eu-west-1
Medium
Accounts scanned: 4 | Misconfigs: 23 | Critical: 3 | Compliance: 68%
Benchmarked against the frameworks your auditors expect
// What's Included
Our cloud security services are structured around four assessment pillars. Each pillar addresses a distinct layer of your cloud environment: who can access what, how resources are configured, how networks are segmented, and whether your logging and monitoring stack would actually detect an incident in progress.
// Scope
Our cloud security services support single-provider, multi-cloud and hybrid environments. Most clients begin with the accounts that hold production workloads and customer data, then expand coverage to development, staging and shared-service accounts over subsequent assessments.
IAM policies, S3 bucket configurations, EC2 security groups, RDS encryption, CloudTrail coverage, KMS key rotation, Lambda execution roles, and AWS Organizations SCPs reviewed against CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark.
Entra ID (Azure AD) roles and conditional access, NSGs, Azure Policy assignments, Key Vault access policies, Storage Account network rules, and Activity Log configurations reviewed against CIS Azure Foundations Benchmark.
IAM bindings, service account key management, VPC firewall rules, Cloud Storage bucket ACLs, Cloud SQL encryption, and Cloud Audit Logs reviewed against CIS GCP Foundations Benchmark and GCP Security Best Practices.
Cross-provider identity federation, shared networking via VPN and interconnect, split-brain DNS configurations, and the consistency of security controls across providers where workloads span AWS, Azure, GCP and on-premises infrastructure.
RBAC policies, network policies, pod security standards, image provenance, secrets management, and cluster-level configurations for EKS, AKS, GKE and self-managed Kubernetes reviewed against CIS Kubernetes Benchmark.
Static analysis of Terraform, CloudFormation, Bicep and Pulumi templates to catch security misconfigurations before they deploy: hardcoded secrets, overly broad resource policies, missing encryption flags and non-compliant defaults.
// Risk Areas
Across AWS, Azure and GCP assessments, a handful of risk categories account for the majority of high and critical findings. Here's what our cloud security services focus on hardest, and what adversaries target first in cloud environments.
Area 01 / 06
Over-permissive IAM policies are the most common critical finding across our cloud assessments. Policies with wildcard actions (*) or wildcard resources, service accounts with long-lived keys, roles that can assume other roles without conditions, and unused credentials that were provisioned once and never revoked combine to create privilege-escalation chains: a low-privilege identity chains together iam:PassRole, sts:AssumeRole and lambda:CreateFunction to reach admin-level access without ever being granted AdministratorAccess directly.
Why it's missed
Native IAM analyzers flag individual over-permissive policies but do not chain permissions across roles and trust relationships. Our review maps the full graph of effective permissions to find escalation paths that no single policy violation would surface.
S3 buckets, Azure Blob containers and GCP Cloud Storage buckets with public access, overly broad bucket policies, missing server-side encryption, and objects accessible via pre-signed URLs that never expire. We also check for database instances (RDS, Cloud SQL, CosmosDB) reachable from the public internet, unencrypted snapshots shared across accounts, and backup storage that lacks access logging.
Why it's missed
The "Block Public Access" toggle at the account level can be overridden by individual bucket policies. We check effective access at the object level, not just the top-level setting, because that's where the actual exposure lives.
Security groups and firewall rules with 0.0.0.0/0 ingress on management ports (SSH, RDP, database ports), VPC peering without restrictive routing, missing network policies in Kubernetes clusters that allow any pod to reach any other pod, and load balancers forwarding traffic to internal services that were never intended to be internet-facing. We map the effective network paths, not just the rules as written, because NACLs, route tables and peering interactions create paths that no single rule review would catch.
Why it's missed
Security groups look correct in isolation, but peering connections, transit gateways and service endpoints create transitive paths. We evaluate reachability from the outside in, tracing the actual packet path through every layer.
CloudTrail disabled in non-primary regions, Azure Activity Logs with short retention, GCP audit logs not exported to a centralized sink, and no alerting on high-risk API calls such as StopLogging, CreateUser, AttachRolePolicy or DeleteTrail. An attacker's first move after initial access is often to disable or tamper with logging; if your monitoring doesn't alert on that action within minutes, the rest of the investigation starts from a blind spot.
Why it's missed
Logging is usually enabled in the primary region and assumed to be on everywhere. We check every region and subscription individually because attackers specifically target regions without coverage.
Privileged containers, host PID/network namespaces shared with pods, missing pod security standards enforcement, RBAC roles with cluster-admin bound to service accounts that don't need it, Kubernetes Secrets stored as base64 (not encrypted at rest), and image registries without vulnerability scanning or admission control. A single privileged pod with a host path mount is often enough to escape the container boundary and reach the underlying node.
Why it's missed
Managed Kubernetes services (EKS, AKS, GKE) secure the control plane, but the workload configuration is still your responsibility. We review the full stack: cluster settings, RBAC, network policies, pod security and image supply chain.
Long-lived access keys that have never been rotated, API tokens and database credentials hardcoded in Lambda environment variables, Terraform state files with plaintext secrets, KMS keys without automatic rotation enabled, and secrets committed to version control that were "removed" in a later commit but remain in git history. We trace the full lifecycle of every credential: creation, storage, usage, rotation schedule and revocation path.
Why it's missed
Secrets scanners check the current code but not IaC state files, environment variable configurations or historical git commits. We scan all three surfaces because leaked secrets don't care where they were left.
0+
Cloud accounts assessed
0+
CIS controls validated per account
0h
Avg. response on critical findings
3
Major clouds: AWS, Azure, GCP
// Methodology
One to four weeks depending on account count. Five phases. Every resource, every policy, every region checked.
#!/bin/bash — cloud-security-assessment
$ discover --accounts --regions --inventory
→ 4 accounts. 12 regions. 847 resources catalogued.
✓ Inventory complete — Week 1
$ audit-iam --roles --policies --escalation-paths
⚠ 23 roles. 4 with admin. 2 escalation paths found.
✓ IAM reviewed — Week 1-2
$ benchmark --cis --well-architected
✗ 200+ controls checked. 68% compliant. 23 misconfigs.
✓ CIS audit complete — Week 2-3
$ audit --network --encryption --logging
✗ 3 SGs allow 0.0.0.0/0. 2 unencrypted. CloudTrail gaps.
✓ Network + crypto reviewed — Week 3
$ report --findings --remediation --walkthrough
→ 23 findings prioritized. Playbook delivered.
✓ Report + walkthrough — Week 4
$
Enumerate all accounts, subscriptions and projects. Catalogue IAM users, roles, service accounts, VPCs, storage, compute and managed services to build a complete inventory before assessment begins.
Analyse every IAM policy, role trust relationship, service account, federation config and cross-account access path. Map effective permissions, identify privilege-escalation chains, unused credentials and missing MFA enforcement.
Compare live configs against CIS Benchmarks for each provider: compute, storage, database, serverless and managed services. Check encryption settings, public access flags, default credentials and drift from IaC baselines.
Map VPC architecture, security groups, firewall rules, peering and load balancers for public exposure and lateral-movement paths. Validate encryption at rest and in transit. Verify logging and monitoring coverage across all regions.
Prioritized report with CVSS 4.0 scores, CIS Benchmark mapping, evidence screenshots and fix-ready remediation guidance. Live walkthrough with your team. Clear ownership and timelines for every finding.
// Deliverables
Every cloud security services engagement ends with documentation that's built to be used: by engineers remediating findings, by leadership prioritizing investment, and by auditors verifying due diligence.
Written for non-technical stakeholders, with overall cloud security posture, aggregate risk rating and business impact explained in plain language suitable for board reporting.
Every misconfiguration documented with CVSS 4.0 score, CIS Benchmark control mapping, evidence screenshots, affected resources and step-by-step reproduction details.
Fix-ready instructions for every finding: the exact CLI command, Terraform change, console setting or policy modification required, with before-and-after examples.
A control-by-control pass/fail matrix against the CIS Benchmark for each provider in scope, ready to be submitted directly as audit evidence.
A live call with our assessors to walk through every finding, answer questions, assign ownership and agree on a remediation plan with prioritized timelines.
Five deliverables. One engagement. Everything your team and your auditors need.
See a sample report// Why CipherTrivia
A few things set how we run cloud security services apart from an automated scanner report with a logo on it.
Our assessors hold certifications and practical experience across AWS, Azure and GCP. We assess each provider against its native security framework as well as cross-provider consistency, not a one-size-fits-all checklist.
Automated tools catch individual CIS violations. Our assessors chain them: a read-only role plus a misconfigured trust policy plus a missing SCP equals admin access. That chaining is manual analysis, not a scanner output.
Every finding is mapped to CIS, Well-Architected and applicable regulatory frameworks (ISO 27001, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA), so the report serves as audit evidence without rework.
Every finding includes the exact CLI command, Terraform snippet or console change required to remediate. Your engineers spend time fixing, not researching how to fix.
// Proof of Work
Cloud Security · SaaS & Multi-Account AWS
A B2B SaaS company operating across 12 AWS accounts needed a comprehensive cloud security assessment ahead of their SOC 2 Type II audit. We identified 23 findings, including a critical privilege-escalation chain through misconfigured cross-account roles, public S3 buckets containing customer uploads, and CloudTrail disabled in 4 non-primary regions. All findings were remediated within the audit timeline.
Read case study// FAQ
Our cloud security services cover Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud Platform (GCP), including multi-cloud and hybrid environments. We also assess Kubernetes clusters (EKS, AKS, GKE and self-managed), container platforms and Infrastructure as Code templates (Terraform, CloudFormation, Bicep) regardless of the underlying provider.
A penetration test simulates an attacker exploiting application-layer vulnerabilities. A cloud security assessment reviews the configuration, identity, network and logging layers of your cloud environment against established benchmarks (CIS, Well-Architected Framework). The two are complementary: a penetration test finds what an attacker can exploit today, while a cloud security assessment finds the structural misconfigurations that make future exploitation easier or harder to detect.
We require read-only access to the accounts and subscriptions in scope. We provide the exact IAM policy or role definition upfront so your team can review and approve it before granting access. No write permissions are needed for the assessment itself. For AWS, this is typically a cross-account role with SecurityAudit and ViewOnlyAccess managed policies. For Azure and GCP, equivalent read-only roles apply.
Every finding is mapped to the relevant CIS Benchmark control, the provider's own security framework (AWS Well-Architected, Azure Security Benchmark, GCP Security Best Practices), and where applicable to ISO 27001, SOC 2, PCI DSS and HIPAA control families. This dual mapping means the report can serve directly as audit evidence for both cloud-specific and regulatory compliance requirements.
A single-account assessment typically completes in one to two weeks. Multi-account or multi-cloud engagements with dozens of subscriptions, complex IAM hierarchies and Kubernetes clusters generally run two to four weeks. We agree on timelines during the scoping phase, and critical findings are flagged within 48 hours of discovery rather than held until the final report.
Tell us about your AWS, Azure or GCP environment and we'll scope a cloud security services engagement that fits your compliance timeline and operational requirements.